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International Project Finance
Harold F. Moore* and Evelyn D. Giaccio**
I. Introduction
International project finance involves many types of credit sup-
port. Successful project financing brings together the most useful
equity and debt components available which enable the project to
generate cash flow, tax benefits and host or supplier country credits.
This article discusses the relevance of credit controls, sovereign de-
faults, political risk and exchange risks, as well as the usefulness of
devices such as government assisted trade finance or insurance,
counter trade, currency swaps, interest rate swaps and several new
types of debt instruments and facilities that have been added to the
international bond market. A general definition of project financing
is presented first with an overview of the risks involved and risk
minimalization techniques. Various documentation issues outline
the legal framework involved in any project financing, and help focus
specifically on considerations particular to international projects.
Several recent developments in U.S. project financing illustrate
generic legal issues. The developments reviewed in this article in-
clude: 1) the validity of contracts containing "take-or-pay" provi-
sions and the contractual defenses applicable to such contracts, and
2) the concept of 'force majeure." When transactions are international
in scope and sovereign credit may be involved and itself createforce
majeure, the latter issue becomes more important.
II. Elements of Project Financing
A. Definition of Project Financing
Much confusion stems from the various uses of the term "pro-
ject financing." This article uses the term in its historical context to
refer to financing of the construction or development of a project
where the lenders rely primarily on the expected cash flow generated
by the operation of the project for repayment of their loans as well as
* Associate, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, New York, New York. B.S. 1968,
Ph.D., 1970, Fordham University; J.D. 1980, University of Notre Dame.
** Associate, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, New York, New York. B.A. 1982,
Barnard College (Summa Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa); J.D. 1985, Harvard Law
School.
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for the value of the project's assets.' The term includes more than
mere lending to a project if the loan is made directly on the credit of
the sponsoring entities. While the credit of the sponsors may be
indirectly involved either in the supply of raw material to the project
or in the consumption of the product or project, the financing is not
a direct obligation of the sponsors and does not appear as a direct
loan obligation on the liability side of the sponsor's balance sheet.
A separate project entity, such as a partnership, joint venture or
special purpose corporation usually is formed for the sole purpose of
owning and operating the project. To finance the project, the lender
makes loans to this newly created entity. The loans are non-recourse
to the project's sponsors. Non-recourse loans are required because
projects involve parties from more than one legal system and often
require additional credit support from guarantees and contractual
undertakings of sponsors and other interested third parties. Third
party project participants include purchasers or suppliers of the pro-
ject's output and services, lessees of the project, and the host gov-
ernment or export credit agencies of countries whose products are
used to construct or operate the project. Under the contract with the
project company, these entities provide funds for servicing project
debts, or guarantees of debt, or insurance for financing other aspects
of the project. Lenders rely on these third party contracts to miti-
gate the commercial and political risks inherent in project financing.
B. Risk Identification
The lender's most critical concern at the outset of a proposed
international project financing is the identification of all sources of
risks. Many are similar or merely an expanded formulation of risks
found in a domestic project financing. The life of a project can be
divided into two phases: the construction phase and the operating
phase. During the construction phase, the principal risk is whether
the project will be completed and if it is completed, whether it will be
completed on time and at an acceptable cost.2 Following comple-
tion, operating risks arise, such as whether the project works as
designed, whether it is efficient, and whether the costs of the raw
materials and the price and size of the market for output meet with
the initial projections. Throughout both phases, tax and regulatory
issues in the jurisdictions of both the project and the sponsors affect
the project.
Political risks in international financing are more acute than in
I E. Gewirtz, Presentation to the 1983 Project Finance Symposium, Tokyo, Japan,
Institute for International Research 1 (June 22, 1983) (unpublished manuscript); I P.
NEVIrT, PROJECT FINANCING 3 (4th ed. 1983).
2 j. Worenklein, Presentation to the Energy Bureau Conference on Project Financ-
ing (May 21, 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
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domestic project financing, and the choice of law applicable to all
aspects of the project is international in scope. Throughout the life
of the project, the relationship of the currencies of the sponsors and
the project adds to the international risk. The risks of each phase
differ and must be identified and allocated among the participants at
the outset. Documentation difficulties in allocation of risk arise when
the debt interests seek to allocate risk to equity participants while
maintaining unfettered rights to the collateral.
1. Construction Phase
Prior to lender involvement, permits are required to conduct
and to secure government project feasibility studies. Feasibility risk
assessment anticipates for the lifespan of the project the availability
and cost of raw materials, and the market for project output at rea-
sonable prices. Changes in laws governing the project constitute
substantial political risks, making the host government's attitude to-
ward the project a critical consideration. If the government is inter-
ested in the development of the project because it creates jobs or
supports other national interests, permits may be quickly secured
and risks are minimal. Indeed, the host government may actively
promote the project. At a minimum, the benign neglect of the host
government should be assured before spending heavily during
construction.
Once a project is deemed technologically and economically fea-
sible and the host government's interest or cooperation with the
sponsors is assured, the host government issues a mandate or the
sponsors seek financing appropriate to the construction and opera-
tion of the project. The form of financing is matched to the different
risks involved in each phase.
The lender's risks in the construction phase are linked with the
political and technological risks of the project. In the construction
phase lenders have no cash flow upon which to rely for repayment.
Lenders are at maximum risk for loss of principal and interest if the
project is not completed, is delayed, or if costs are substantially in-
creased due to regulatory requirement changes. In the construction
phase, a change in governments with a concomitant change in atti-
tude toward the project can be just as troublesome as civil distur-
bance or war. A new government can use import or export
restrictions, exchange controls, or labor and tax laws to interfere
with construction and timely completion of the project within
budget.
The technological risk that the project, though completed on
time and within budget, does not start or cannot achieve design ca-
pacity, may create a credit bind. Construction loans are typically
short term, concluding at the start of commercial operations. As the
1986]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
project successfully passes start-up procedures, construction lenders
expect repayment from permanent financing provided by project
sponsors or interested third parties.
2. Operational Phase
Once the project passes the construction stage, the major risk
becomes the ability of the project cash flow to service the debt. The
operational phase is considerably longer than the construction
phase, making economic risks greater. The accuracy of the economic
and technological feasibility study is vital. Adequate raw materials
must be available within projected cost, customers for the output
must be prepared to purchase projected amounts at projected prices,
and capable management must be present in the host country. Accu-
rate projections of currency and foreign exchange relationships be-
tween the host country currency, the loan currency, and the sponsor
country are similarly significant.
Expropriation and civil disturbance are obvious political risks.
More insidious risks are creeping expropriation through taxation,
regulation of ownership or management, import or export restric-
tions on raw materials or finished goods, and the ability to enforce
security interests in the physical assets of the plant, raw materials,
and finished goods.
If the above risks are properly allocated between the debt and
the equity interests, the debt must be financially engineered to match
the cash flow stream. Various combinations of accrual notes which
change to interest payments, graduated payment loans, and other
devices help to accomplish these goals.
III. Mitigation of Risks; Limitations
A. Pre-Completion
Prior to the completion of a project, when all components exist
for providing credit support to service the debt, the project contracts
provide the lender with various rights and remedies. Typically these
rights include recourse and access to a creditworthy entity. The pre-
completion obligations of the sponsor typically assure the lenders
that: (a) the project will be completed by a certain date (within
agreed on mechanical, operating and financial parameters), (b) all
cost overruns and other incidental matters will be funded in a timely
fashion and on acceptable terms, and (c) the sponsors can obtain all
funding necessary to service the debt until the project is completed.3
3 "Completion" should be defined comprehensively for each project. The definition
should include reasonably objective means for identifying any circumstance necessary for




The sponsor's undertaking of project completion can be secured
in various ways. If off-balance sheet financing is not required, the
lender may consider a direct guarantee of the pre-completion debt.
If a direct guarantee cannot be used, indirect credit support in the
form of required equity contributions or fully subordinated debt may
suffice. An unconditional obligation of the sponsor to purchase the
debt instruments offers equivalent protection if project completion is
not achieved.
In addition to the foregoing general concerns, international
projects must contend with exchange and political risks. During con-
struction, the risk of foreign exchange losses usually is borne by the
sponsors who provide additional funding. However, lenders may as-
sume some of the exchange risk "through multi-currency loans
which give borrowers an option, based on a fixed exchange rate, of
repayment in different currencies." 4 Ordinarily, a concession agree-
ment with the central bank of the host country governs the ability of
the project company to deal in local or foreign currencies.
A common concession agreement between the host government
and foreign sponsors provides each party certain assurances regard-
ing foreign currency remittances, import licenses, tax liability, for-
eign personnel, and the extent of equity participation by the host
country. 5 Project planners should be sensitive to the potential risks
of host country involvement in the disposition of project output and
in management's decision-making. In the case of petroleum and
mining projects, the concession agreement should describe the
rights of foreign sponsors to conduct exploration, development, pro-
duction and marketing.6
In addition to the concession agreement, to minimize their ex-
posure to political risk, lenders may request of the host country:
(i) advance assurances that licenses and permits requiring the sanc-
tion of an agency of the host country will be granted, 7 (ii) any neces-
sary governmental approvals of long-term sales contracts,
assignment of the proceeds of such contracts, and registration of
debt, (iii) a "non-interference" agreement that the host country will
not interfere with the operation of the project or repayment of the
debt, and (iv) political risk insurance against expropriation.
Political risks can be lessened further by "multi-nationalizing"
the sources of finance for the project. The involvement of lenders
4 J. Worenklein, Remarks to the American Council of Life Insurance, Committee on
Securities Investment 3 (March 15, 1983); 15 P. NEviTr, PROJECT FINANCING 164 (4th ed.
1983).
5 See Rendell & Niehuss, International Project Finance, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
LAW: LENDING, CAPITAL TRANSFERS AND INSTITUTIONS 31 (R. Rendell ed. 1983).
6 See id. at 36.
7 See 2 P. NEVrrr, PROJECT FINANCING 16 (4th ed. 1983); Rendell & Niehuss, supra
note 5, at 33-37.
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from different countries and the participation of official international
institutions such as the World Bank and regional development banks
minimizes the possibility of arbitrary political action by the host
country.
Exchange risks can vitiate this political risk reduction technique
if the currencies of the project's revenues are not closely matched
with the currencies of the debt. An alternative method is to require
the payment of debt service at a place and in a currency which cir-
cumvent the political and currency risks associated with the project.
Irreducible political risks attend any project, and the willingness of a
lender to accept such risks, thereby sharing and minimizing the risks
of the project, may be the very reason the lender has been invited to
participate in the financing.
B. Post-Completion
1. Enforceability
Typically, upon completion, the lenders only have recourse to
the project and its revenues. To assure repayment of the obligation
under all circumstances, the project's ability to generate revenues
may be supported by a variety of credit or contract undertakings,
such as the sponsor's obligation to purchase goods, to maintain
working capital in a specific form and manner, or to repay the loan
throughout production. Accordingly, the enforceability of such un-
dertakings is of central importance in analyzing whether the project
can support the credit granted. Recent U.S. cases indicate that
"take-or-pay," "hell-or-high water" and similar unconditional con-
tractual obligations, in a properly documented and structured pro-
ject financing, are, generally, enforceable in U.S. courts.8 However,
limitations on enforceability based on the procedural and substan-
tive provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") should
be reviewed carefully in any project.9 Moreover, in addition to ordi-
nary contractual obligation defenses, three primary defenses have
been pursued against unconditional project support obligations:force
majeure, impossibility and regulatory defenses.
In In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.' 0 the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court upheld a "hell-or-high water" clause in a contract under New
York law. West Virginia leased computer equipment from O.P.M.
under a master lease, whereby West Virginia had an "absolutely un-
conditional" obligation to pay O.P.M.'s assignee, LaSalle, amounts
due under the equipment schedules."I The equipment schedules
8 See In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 21 Bankr. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
9 See Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, Equipment Leasing Under the Bankruptcy Code, PRAC. L.
INST., March 11, 1985, at 307.
10 21 Bankr. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
1 1 Id. at 1006.
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obligated O.P.M. to reimburse West Virginia for monthly mainte-
nance charges for the leased equipment. The schedules provided
that any breach of O.P.M.'s maintenance obligations would not affect
West Virginia's duty to make monthly lease payments. When O.P.M.
failed to pay the maintenance charges, West Virginia stopped paying
under the equipment schedules. LaSalle sought enforcement of
West Virginia's "hell-or-high water" obligation under the equipment
schedule, despite the fact that both O.P.M. and West Virginia de-
faulted on their respective payment obligations.
The court found that the "hell-or-high water" provision man-
dated that West Virginia pay its rental obligations to LaSalle regard-
less of any defenses West Virginia had against O.P.M., including
O.P.M.'s default in paying its maintenance obligations.1 2 The "hell-
or-high water" clause was found to be neither illegal nor uncon-
scionable, notwithstanding West Virginia's possible obligation to
make double maintenance payments on the leased equipment.' 3
In reaching its holding, the court stated, "to deny this clause its
full force and effect would effectively reconstruct the contract con-
trary to the intent of the parties, which reconstruction would be im-
permissible."' 4 Furthermore, the court noted that such "hell-or-
high water" clauses are essential to the equipment leasing industry:
"To deny their effect as a matter of law would seriously chill business
in this industry because it is by means of those clauses that a pro-
spective financier-assignee of rental payments is guaranteed mean-
ingful security for his outright loan to the lessor.. -15 The
Bankruptcy Court further held that the "hell-or-high water" clause
rendered West Virginia's allegations that LaSalle took the assign-
ment in bad faith with knowledge of claims and defenses irrelevant. 16
LaSalle was granted summary judgment on the issue of liability on its
counterclaim for accelerated rentals.
12 Id. at 1005-08.
13 Id. at 1006-07.
14 Id. at 1006 (citing Rodolitz v. Neptune Paper Prods., Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 383, 386, 239
N.E.2d 628, 630, 292 N.Y.S.2d 878, 881 (1968)).
Earlier cases upholding "take-or-pay" contracts were based on the standard principle
of contract construction that requires a court to ascertain and give effect to the parties'
intent and consider the contract as a whole. See, e.g., Oliver-Mercer Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
Fisher, 146 N.W.2d 346 (N.D. 1966) (contract for the supply of electricity, providing for
payment of minimum annual charges for three years not a "requirements contract" under
which a supplier agreed only to sell the amount of electricity actually used by a consumer,
but rather an "availability" or "take-or-pay" contract); General Cable Corp. v. Citizens
Util. Co., 27 Ariz. App. 381, 555 P.2d 350 (1976) (minimum charges for electricity re-
quired under "take-or-pay" contract neither void as against public policy nor illegal under
state or federal law).
15 O.P.M. Leasing, 21 Bankr. at 1007. See generally B. FRITCH & A. REITMAN, EQUIP-
MENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 131-32 (1977); Contino, Legal and Financial Aspects of
Equipment Leasing, 29 PRENTICE HALL USA 87 (1979).
16 See O.P.M. Leasing, 21 Bankr. at 1007.
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2. Force Majeure
The "hell-or-high water" contract involved in O.P.M. Leasing was
an unconditional promise providing no exemption for any party's
failure to-perform its contractual undertakings. Frequently, how-
ever, purchase contracts in project financings contain a force majeure
provision 17 excusing a party for delay or failure to perform in such
events as fire, flood, acts of God, interference of civil or military au-
thorities, and other contingencies. A force majeure provision amelio-
rates the harsh effects of a "take-or-pay" contract. When a force
majeure provision is included in a "take-or-pay" contract, the con-
tract's enforceability usually depends on the language of the provi-
sion and how it is triggered.
Courts reject the argument that a change in governmental regu-
lation constitutes a force majeure condition sufficient to relieve pur-
chaser of its obligation under the contract. In making this
determination, courts carefully scrutinize every clause and sentence
of the force majeure provision to determine the intent of the con-
17 A typicalforce majeure provision provides as follows:
Force Majeure. If by reason of force majeure either party hereto is ren-
dered unable, wholly or in part, to carry out its obligations under this Agree-
ment, and if such party gives notice and reasonably full particulars of such
force majeure in writing or by telegraph to the other within a reasonable time
as and to the extent that it is affected by such force majeure, shall not be
liable in damages during the continuance of any inability so caused, provided
such cause shall so far as possible be remedied with all reasonable dispatch.
Definition. The term "force majeure" as used herein shall mean acts of
God, strikes, lockouts, or other industrial disturbances; act of a public en-
emy, earthquakes, fires, storms (including but not limited to hurricanes or
hurricane warnings), crevasses, floods, washouts; arrests and restraints of the
government, either federal or state, civil or military, civil disturbances, shut-
downs for purposes of necessary repairs, relocation, or construction of facili-
ties; breakage or accident to machinery or lines of pipe; the necessity for
testing (as required by governmental authority or as deemed necessary by
the testing party for the safe operation thereof), the necessity of making re-
pairs or alterations to machinery or lines of pipe; failure of surface equip-
ment or pipelines; accidents, breakdowns, inability of either party hereto to
obtain necessary material, supplies, or permits, or labor to perform or com-
ply with any obligation or condition of this Agreement; right of way; and any
other causes, whether of the kind herein enumerated or otherwise, which are
not reasonably in the control of the party claiming suspension. It is under-
stood and agreed that the settlement of strikes or lockouts shall be entirely
within the discretion of the party having the difficulty and that the above
requirement that any force majeure shall be remedied with all reasonable
dispatch shall not require the settlement of strikes or lockouts by acceding to
the demands of an opposing party when such course is inadvisable in the
discretion of the party having the difficulty.
Limitations. Such force majeure affecting the performance hereunder by
either Shipper or Transporter, however, shall not relieve such party of liabil-
ity in the event of concurring negligence or in the event of failure to use due
diligence to remedy the situation and to remove the cause in an adequate
manner and with all reasonable dispatch, nor shall such causes or contingen-
cies affecting such performance relieve either party from its obligations to
make payments as determined hereunder.
This provision was taken from a book located in the law office of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley
& McCloy, New York, New York.
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tracting party. For example, in McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewel Coal & Coke
Co.1 8 the parties entered into a "take-or-pay" contract for the sale of
coke over a term of fifteen years. The contract contained a provision
excusing the performance of both the seller and the buyer ".... in the
event, and during the continuance, of any action by governmental
authority (whether now or hereafter effective) .... ,""9 Thirteen years
after the contract was entered into, the Virginia Air Pollution Con-
trol Board ordered the seller to cease operating a particular plant.
The court found that "no final [present] order" nor any possible fu-
ture governmental action had prevented or appeared likely to pre-
vent the buyer's compliance with the contract. 20
Similarly, in International Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. Llano, Inc.
2 1
the Tenth Circuit held that compliance with a state environmental
regulation did not excuse the buyer's performance under the force
majeure clause of a "take-or-pay" natural gas contract. The force
majeure provision at issue exempted either party from performance
"occasioned" by standardforce majeure events (such as fire and flood)
and required the party seeking to be excused from performance to
immediately notify the other party of all pertinent facts and take all
reasonable steps to prevent the occurrence of non-performance.
The "take-or-pay" contract also contained an "adjustment of mini-
mum bill" provision, permitting an adjustment of the buyer's mini-
mum purchase requirement if the buyer was ". . . unable to receive
gas ... for any reason beyond the reasonable control of the parties .... ,22
The trial court rejected the buyer's force majeure defense and
found that the force majeure provision would excuse performance only
if the governmental regulation made this purchase of the minimum
amount of gas contracted for absolutely impossible or illegal.
23
Although the court of appeals agreed with the trial court's result it
based its holding on other grounds. Looking to the particular lan-
guage of the contract, the court of appeals noted that adequate
notice was required to trigger the protection of the force majeure pro-
vision. Since the buyer gave the seller no reasons why gas consump-
tion would be decreased, the court determined that the buyer failed
to sufficiently inform the seller.24 The court also relied on the princi-
ple that "when a promisor can perform a contract in either of two
alternative ways, the impracticability of one alternative does not ex-
cuse the promisor if performance by means of the other alternative is
18 570 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1978).
19 Id. at 597, 608.
20 Id. at 608.
21 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985).
22 Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
23 Id. at 884.
24 Id. at 885-86.
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still practicable. ' 2 5 Thus, even if compliance with the governmental
regulation prevented the buyer from taking the gas, it did not excuse
the buyer's duty to pay.
3. Impracticability
To the extent that a contingency is not covered by a particular
force majeure provision, the commercial impracticability defense may
be available.26 Historically, courts have recognized that certain con-
tracts can be voided by public policy because of impossibility, frus-
tration of purpose, or mutual mistake of fact. Over the years these
doctrines have merged to create a more general body of law on im-
possibility. 27 The defense of impossibility or impracticability under
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) section 2-61528 applies to con-
tracts involved in project financings.29 Comment 3 to U.C.C. section
2-615 states that the term "impractical" was written into the Code to
25 Id. at 885 (citing Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 462 F.2d 204, 211
(10th Cir. 1972); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1960);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS comment f (1981).
26 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.
1976).
27 For a discussion of the various doctrines and the historical development in this
area, see, Comment, Relief from Burdensome Long-Term Contracts: Commercial Impracticability,
Frustration of Purpose, Mutual Mistake of Fact, and Equitable Adjustments, 47 Mo. L. REv. 79, 83
(1982).
28 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978) provides:
Except as so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject
to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who
complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a con-
tract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith
with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order
whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of
the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries
among his customers but may at his option include regular customers not
then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture.
He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay
or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the
estimated quota thus made available for the buyer.
29 The U.C.C. has been adopted in every state except Louisiana. U.C.C. § 2-102
(1978) states that article 2 of the Code applies to the "sale of goods." U.C.C. § 2-105
(1978) defines goods as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which
the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action." Electricity
and fossil fuel products have been held to be goods under § 2-105. U.C.C. § 2-105
(1978); See, e.g., Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir.
1974) (crude oil); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(jet fuel); Oshey Gasoline Oil Co. v. OKC Ref., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Minn. 1973)
(gasoline); Hedges v. Public Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 396 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
(electricity); Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 624
(1974) (propane gas); Gardner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612
(1964) (natural gas).
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lessen the rigidity of the common law approach to impossibility.3 0
Despite this statement of the intent of the framers of the U.C.C.,
courts have been slow to retreat from their dim view of the defense
of impossibility. 3 '
U.C.C. section 2-615 speaks in terms of "a seller" seeking to
escape a breach of his duty on the ground of commercial impractica-
bility. In a project financing, the buyer often wishes to avoid its
"take-or-pay" obligations. In Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group
(ALCOA) 32 the court applied U.C.C. section 2-615 to a buyer's claim
of impracticability. The court voided for impracticability a toll con-
version service contract when the price of the contract goods rose
substantially due to sharp increases in OPEC oil prices.33 Although
the contract price was tied to OPEC oil prices, the parties never in-
tended, at the time of contracting, that such a large increase in price
would be enforced under the contract. Although ALCOA did not in-
volve a "take-or-pay" contract, it indicates that courts may be willing
to follow the intent of the drafters of the U.C.C. by liberalizing re-
quirements for commercial impracticability.
In order to invoke the common law doctrine of impracticability,
a three-prong test must be met. First, an unexpected contingency
must have occurred which was not contemplated by the parties at the
time the contract was entered into. Second, the party claiming im-
practicability must not have assumed the risk of the unexpected con-
tingency either by agreement or by custom. Third, the performance
of the contract must be rendered commercially impracticable due to
the occurrence of the contingency.34
Although the Tenth Circuit in International Minerals rejected the
force majeure defense, the court voided the "take-or-pay" contract on
the basis of impracticability under U.C.C. section 2-615. The court
interpreted the word "unable" in the "minimum bill" provision to
be synonymous with "impracticable," and found that the promulga-
tion of the environmental regulation constituted an event "beyond
the reasonable control" of the buyer.3 5 Thus, under the minimum
bill provision, the buyer would not be required to pay for any natural
gas not taken under the contract.36
The court in International Minerals relied upon a Fifth Circuit de-
cision, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.3 7 which ex-
30 U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 3 (1978).
31 See Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the U.C.C.
Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 203 (1979).
32 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (Teitelbaum,J.).
33 Id. at 76.
34 See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 365 F.2d 312, 315-16 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
35 International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 886-87.
36 Id. at 887.
37 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
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amined a force majeure clause in light of U.C.C. section 2-615. In
Eastern Airlines, McDonnell Douglas failed to deliver jet planes to
Eastern on time due to its voluntary compliance with the U.S. Govern-
ment's request to provide planes for use in the Vietnam War. Mc-
Donnell Douglas argued that under the force majeure provision of the
contract, the war acted as a condition that excused delay. The Fifth
Circuit held that the exclusion of a contingency in a force majeure
clause does not prevent that contingency from being protected by
U.C.C. section 2-615.38 Moreover, as a matter of law, governmental
policy need not be mandatory to cause impracticability.3 9
Thus, the defense of commercial impracticability provides an
"end run" around where a contingency is not addressed in the con-
tract. The impracticability defense does not excuse a party's per-
formance of its "take-or-pay" obligations if the party claiming
impracticability assumed the risk of the unexpected contingency.
The very existence of a "take-or-pay" clause in a contract indicates
that the buyer has assumed risks such as inadequate capacity and de-
creased demand. A well-drafted "take-or-pay" contract that pro-
vides for payment regardless of the contract's unprofitability, failure
of production or completion, or any other situation, affords a lender
protection.
4. Regulatory Defenses
Another category of defenses recently asserted by natural gas
purchasers involve certain regulatory defenses. The purchasers
claim that their "take-or-pay" obligations under natural gas con-
tracts violate the maximum lawful price provisions of the Natural Gas
Policy Act (NGPA). 40 The NGPA establishes a "maximum lawful
ceiling price" for "first sale" gas. 41 Purchasers argue that if they pay
as required by a "take-or-pay" clause for gas not received, they vio-
late the maximum ceiling price. The money paid divided by the vol-
ume of gas taken under the contract exceeds the regulated price,
especially if deficient payments are not made up by subsequent tak-
ers of gas.
The maximum lawful price defense is an issue of first impression
for the courts and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). Courts that have ruled on this issue have determined that
payments under "take-or-pay" contracts for gas not taken or made
up do not void the contract as a violation of "maximum lawful
prices" under the NGPA. Furthermore, a district court may exercise
38 Id. at 988-89.
39 Id. at 992-93.
40 13 U.S.C. § 3314 (1982).
41 Id.
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its discretion to retain a case without either referring it to FERC or
staying any of the proceedings.
In Sid Richardson Carbon Gasolile v. Internorth42 the plaintiff-pro-
ducers sought to enjoin the defendant-purchaser from withholding
twenty percent of the amount payable to plaintiffs for current sales of
natural gas under certain "take-or-pay" contracts. The defendant
contended that the plaintiffs' sale of gas was a "first sale" within the
meaning of section 3301(21) of the NGPA, 43 and subject to the maxi-
mum lawful price ceiling for natural gas. 4 4 The defendant con-
tended that paying for gas that it did not take elevated the price of
gas actually received beyond the lawful maximum price allowable
under the NGPA. 45 Allegedly, this situation was created because the
"take-or-pay" deficiency payments were not made up during the con-
tract's five year recruitment period. The court stated that "although
this creative argument has a certain sophistic appeal," judicial au-
thorities support the view that "take-or-pay" clauses are not void
42 595 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
43 15 U.S.C. § 3301(21) (1982) provides:
(A) The term "first sale" means any sale of any volume of natural gas-
(i) to any interstate pipeline or intrastate pipeline;
(ii) to any local distribution company;
(iii) to any person for use by such person;
(iv) which precedes any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii); and
(v) which precedes or follows any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), (iii),
or (iv) and is defined by the Commission as a first sale in order to prevent
circumvention of any maximum lawful price established under this Act.
(B) Certain sales not included. Clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of subparagraph
(A) shall not include the sale of any volume of natural gas by any interstate
pipeline, intrastate pipeline, or local distribution company, or any affiliate
thereof, unless such sale is attributable to volumes of natural gas produced
by such interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline, or local distribution company,
or any affiliate thereto.
44 15 U.S.C. § 3314(b) (1982) provides:
(1) General rule. The maximum lawful price under this section for any
month shall be the higher of-
(A)(i) the just and reasonable rate, per million Btu's, established by the
Commission which was (or would have been) applicable to the first sale of
such natural gas on April 20, 1977, in the case of April, 1977; and
(A)(ii) in the case of any month thereafter, the maximum lawful price, per
million Btu's prescribed under this subparagraph for the preceding month
multiplied by the monthly equivalent of the annual inflation adjustment
factor applicable for such month, or
(B) any just and reasonable rate which was established by the Commis-
sion after April 27, 1977, and before the date of the enactment of this Act
and which is applicable to such natural gas.
(2) Ceiling prices may be increased if just and reasonable. The Commis-
sion may, by rule or order, prescribe a maximum lawful ceiling price, applica-
ble to any first sale of any natural gas (or category thereof, as determined by
the preceding provisions of this section if such price is-
(A) higher than the maximum lawful price which would otherwise be ap-
plicable under such provisions; and
(B) just and reasonable within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act. (Nov.
9, 1978, P.L. 95-621, Title I, Subtitle A, § 104, 92 Stat. 3362).
45 Internorth, 595 F. Supp. at 500.
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under the NGPA. 46 Thus, the court found that plaintiffs had estab-
lished a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits in their
breach of contract cause of action.
In Koch Industries Inc. v. Columbus Gas Transmission Corp.47 the
court, following Internorth, rejected the defendant-buyers' maximum
lawful price defense. 48 The court noted that in addition to being con-
trary to recent case law, the maximum lawful price defense is unsup-
ported by the NGPA regulations, specifically 18 C.F.R. section
271.504(a), which defines contract price. 49 Under the C.F.R. regula-
tion, a "take-or-pay" deficiency cannot increase the unit price of gas
sold because that price is determined solely on the basis of gas that is
actually delivered, not available but not taken. 50 Thus, a "take-or-
pay" contract controls when the seller is paid for the gas he sells.
5. Creditors' Rights
Even if "take-or-pay" agreements are enforceable, laws gov-
erning creditors' rights may limit the remedies of a lender relying on
such agreements for repayment. Consider a typical case in which a
project company debtor ("PC") enters into a "take-or-pay" contract
("contract") with a creditworthy sponsor ("S"). The rights of PC
under the "take-or-pay" contract are then assigned to a lender ("L").
Under the laws of the United States, depending on the nature of the
"take-or-pay" obligation and other terms of the contractual under-
taking of S, it can be argued that (i) S's obligations under the con-
tract are similar to those of guarantor, or alternatively, (ii) PC
granted a security interest in PC's contract with S to L. Thus, L is
entitled to the benefits of a guarantee by S of PC's obligation or to a
secured party's status.
Under the Bankruptcy Code the different categorizations pro-
duce different results. If PC became the subject of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding and S was a guarantor, L could still proceed against S for
equitable remedies and/or contract damages pursuant to the terms
46 The Internorth court cited the only case on point, Southport Exploration, Inc. v.
Producer's Gas Co., No. 83-CO550-BT (N.D. Okla. June 1, 1984), for this proposition. In
Southport the defendant failed to "take-or-pay" for the minimum amount of gas contracted
for, and also failed to make "take-or-pay" deficiency payments upon the seller's request.
47 No. 83-900-A (D.C. La. Mar. 14, 1985).
48 The court also refused to recognize a common law commercial impracticability
defense because Louisiana has not expressly adopted the U.C.C. The doctrine thus is not
incorporated in the state's case law. See also Superior Oil Co. v. Transco Energy Co., CA
No. 2138 (W.D. La. 1985).
49 18 C.F.R. § 271.504(a) (1985) defines the "contract price" as:
(1) The total price paid per MMBtu for delivery of natural gas occur-
rency on that date ...
(2) If no delivery of natural gas occurred under such contract on that
date, the total price per MMBtu that would have been paid for delivery of
natural gas on that date ...
50 15 U.S.C. § 3301(22) (1982) defines delivery under the NGPA as "the physical
delivery from the seller."
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of the contract, and PC's bankruptcy should not affect S's obligation.
Under the secured party categorization, PC could use the proceeds
of payments made by S to PC, so long as L was given "adequate
protection" under section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code.5 1 Since such
a result could have dramatic effects on project revenue, the risk of
that result merits a detailed review.
The bankruptcy of S would also severely affect the project.
Upon becoming the subject of a proceeding in bankruptcy, S has the
right to assume or reject the contract. If S assumes the contract, S
has the right, notwithstanding any prohibition against assignment, to
assign the contract to a third party.5 2 If, on the other hand, S rejects
the contract, L has claim for damages against S (assuming the assign-
ment is in proper form). However, the extent of damages which L
can recover is not necessarily equal to the amount of the credit ex-
tended to the project. Instead, recovery depends on a variety of cir-
cumstances including the market price for fair market value of the
product, and any mitigating cost savings resulting from the rejection
of the contract.
If S were deemed to be a guarantor, L most likely would make a
contingent claim in the bankruptcy proceeding against S for the
amount L was unable to collect from PC. A court's categorizations
are difficult to predict, but careful drafting and analysis of the various
possible results should yield a set of risks most lenders would be will-
ing to accept.
Post-completion enforceability issues in international project fi-
nancing presents a plethora of issues not suitable for a general analy-
sis. For each project the consequences of various choice of laws
applications merit thorough analysis. Insofar as a project involves
real estate issues or a mining exploration concession or lien, the law
of the situs of the project governs the enforcement and ownership of
any security interest. A direct mortgage on the project may not be
possible under the laws of the situs jurisdiction, and the ownership,
foreclosure and transferability of any security may be limited.
If the parties to a project find it advantageous, the law of a par-
ticular jurisdiction may be chosen as the governing law of the con-
tract. However, if an obligor to any such contract is subject to the
bankruptcy laws of a different jurisdiction, the bankruptcy laws of the
governing jurisdiction, as well as the effect of such laws on the credit
support for the project deserve careful analysis and review. The
lender's goal is to have recourse to a credit risk on acceptable terms,
for an amount not less than the amount of the total debt.
51 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1985).
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1985).
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IV. Conclusion
Management of international project finance involves a number
of risks, both in the construction and operational phases. In the pre-
completion phase, a concession agreement between the host govern-
ment and the foreign sponsors of the project may serve to minimize
certain economic and political risks. Lenders have recently sought to
limit post-completion risks by utilizing "take-or-pay" or "hell-or-
high water" provisions in contracts with project company debtors.
These provisions require unconditional repayment of loans made to
the project company. Although the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has up-
held the use of "hell-or-high water" clauses, several options appear
available that would mitigate their effect. Inclusion of a force majeure
provision would exempt repayment under some circumstances, such
as acts of God and interference by civil or military authorities. Im-
practicability of performance may be used as a defense to handle
contingencies not covered by the force majeure clause. Regulatory de-
fenses and traditional creditors' remedies may also be available to
lenders involved in international project finance.
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